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H I G H L I G H T S
• Natural gas subsidies of China's industrial sector are investigated.• Regional heterogeneity is investigated from regional and provincial perspectives.• Regional heterogeneity exists in the decomposition on natural gas subsidy.• Regional policies for energy subsidy reform in developing countries are needed.






A B S T R A C T
This paper seeks to investigate the regional heterogeneity in natural gas subsidies of China's industrial sector.
Price-gap approach and logarithmic mean Divisia index method (LMDI) are combined to accomplish this goal.
The results show that there exists regional heterogeneity in the decomposition on the variation of industrial
natural gas subsidy in China. In other words, the factors that contribute to the changes in subsidies differ from a
regional basis. During 2007–2013, consumption exerted a positive impact on the increase of industrial natural
gas subsidies, contributing more than 80% both in the eastern and northeastern regions, followed by 70.66% in
the western region and 69.54% in the central region. During 2013–2016, the main factor affecting the changes in
industrial natural gas subsidies is the pricing mechanism. The pricing mechanism played a significant positive
role in the decline of industrial natural gas subsidies, with contribution rate of 367.73% in the northeastern
region, 80.64% in the eastern region, 75.68% in the central region and 74.34% in the western region. Based on
the results, we suggest that the policy measures enacted by government should differ in regions when promoting
subsidy reform, especially for developing countries with unbalanced regional development.
1. Introduction
In the context of tackling climate change, fossil energy subsidies
have been a global issue. The G20 summit in 2009 proposed to ratio-
nalize fossil fuel subsidies and eliminate fossil fuel subsidies in the
medium term. As the world's largest energy consumer and carbon
emitter, China's energy subsidy reform has attracted much attention. In
2007, China's natural gas subsidies were relatively small with a scale of
57.54 billion USD, accounting for only 10.68% of the total fossil fuel
subsidies [1]. China's natural gas consumption has increased sig-
nificantly in the past decade, and now it is the world's third-largest
natural gas consumer. According to the BP World Energy Statistical
Yearbook (2018)1, global energy demand grew by 2.20% in 2017, while
natural gas consumption grew by 3.02%. In that year, China's natural
gas consumption grew rapidly by 31 billion cubic metres, taking up
about 15% worldwide. With the rapid increase of natural gas con-
sumption, the subsidies scales expanded rapidly in 2013, accounting for
more than 50% of the entire fossil fuel subsidies. How the ratio will
change in the future has attracted the attention of the Chinese gov-
ernment and the world.
In recent years, China has been constantly striving to formulate
reform policies to develop a low-carbon economy, with the increasing
contradiction between resource consumption and environmental pol-
lution. The northern smog opened the prelude to China's comprehen-
sive control of air pollution in 2013. In September 2013, the State
Council of China promulgated ten measures of the Action Plan for the
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Prevention and Control of Air Pollution2, which serves as a guideline for
action in the prevention and control of air pollution throughout the
country. As one of the important measures to improve air quality, “coal
to gas” has been widely promoted. The National Development and
Reform Commission of China has issued opinions on how to do a good
job of natural gas peak-to-winter work in October 2013, aiming at
strengthening demand-side management of natural gas and striving to
ensure the overall stability of natural gas peak-to-winter situation3. In
December 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission of
China enacted the 13th Five-Year Plan for Natural Gas Development4,
which proposed that the proportion of natural gas in the energy con-
sumption structure should increase to more than 10% by 2020. How-
ever, the fact was that natural gas accounted for only 7% of primary
energy consumption in China in 2017. Therefore, natural gas has great
potential for consumption in China in the future.
China's natural gas prices have been regulated by the government
following the basic principle of “cost-plus” for a long time. The cost-
plus means that prices are determined by production costs and rea-
sonable profits, entailing the phenomenon that the consumer price is
clearly below market prices. The low end-consumer prices gave rise to
heavy consumption, entailing inevitable natural gas imports. With the
opening of the Central Asian A-line natural gas pipeline in 2009, natural
gas imports and consumption have increased rapidly. The proportion of
natural gas to total fossil fuel subsidies is nearly 50% in 2013 [2].
Therefore, China's natural gas consumption and subsidy growth deserve
considerable attention.
The BP World Energy Outlook (2018)5 proposes that natural gas
demand growth is dominated by growth in the industrial and power
sectors. According to China natural gas development report (2019)6,
Natural gas consumption in the industrial sector has become the main
driver of China's natural gas demand in the past decade. Also, the Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics7 indicated that, the added value of China
industries accounted for more than 40% of GDP in 2017. And the in-
dustrial sector consumed nearly 67% of total energy consumption and
about 65% of natural gas in 2016. The average annual subsidy of nat-
ural gas in China's industrial sector in 2010–2015 was about 15.87
billion USD, accounting for 53% of the entire natural gas subsidy [3].
The natural gas subsidy is mainly determined by the industrial sector.
Therefore, our study focused on natural gas subsidies in the industrial
sector.
The changes in fossil energy subsidies are closely related to gov-
ernment policies. In recent years, the reforms on natural gas have
mainly focused on the pricing mechanism. The objective of the reform
of China's natural gas pricing mechanism is to establish a dynamic
adjustment mechanism linked to the price of alternative energy, which
can reflect the supply and demand of the market and the scarcity of
resources. In other words, the price relationship between natural gas
and alternative energy is gradually straightened out, and finally, the
price pricing mechanism of natural gas determined by market compe-
tition is formed8. The Chinese government decided to carry out the pilot
work of reforming the price formation mechanism of natural gas in
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces in 20119 and it was implemented
nationwide in 2013. According to the enactment of notice to adjust the
price of natural gas by the National Development and Reform
Commission10, the link of natural gas price management has been ad-
justed from the factory to the gate station. Since then, the pricing
method has changed from the cost-plus method to the market net return
method. In September 2014, the Development and Reform Commission
of China issued a notice on adjusting the price of non-resident natural
gas11, requiring that the price of the highest valve station for non-re-
sident gas stocks be raised by 0.06 dollar per cubic meter. In April 2015,
the Development and Reform Commission issued a notice on rationa-
lizing the price of natural gas for non-residential use12. The document
stated that the price of incremental gas maximum station would reduce
by 0.07 dollar per cubic metre and the price of stock gas maximum
station would increase by 0.01 dollar per cubic metre in order to
achieve price integration and rationalize the price of natural gas for
non-residential use. According to the policy document of National De-
velopment and Reform Commission on natural gas price reform13, the
maximum gate price for non-resident gas would be reduced by 0.11
dollar per cubic meter since November 2015, and the non-resident gas
price has been changed from the maximum gate price management to
the benchmark gate price management. In addition, the buyer and the
seller can negotiate and determine the specific gate price within the
upper 20% and lower unlimited range based on the benchmark gate
price. In accordance with the document of National Development and
Reform Commission on reducing the price of non-residential natural
gas14, the benchmark station price for non-resident gas was cut by 0.02
dollar per cubic meter since September 2017.
Although the Chinese government has made a lot of efforts to pro-
mote the market-oriented reform of natural gas, natural gas subsidies
still have such problems as an intermittent rebound, regional differ-
ences, and failure to deepen the marketization. In order to better solve
the above problems, we need to consider several questions: What are
the factors influencing the change of subsidy scale? Are there differ-
ences in the effects of these factors on changes in subsidies in different
industries or regions? Finding out these answers is of great significance
to optimizing energy structure, environmental pollution control, and
China's energy security.
To the best of our knowledge, abundant studies on China's energy
subsidies have been reported. Lin et al. [4] described the inefficiency
and unfairness of China's energy subsidies back in 2009 and Liu and Li
[5] summarized the advantages and disadvantages of China's fossil
energy subsidies and analyzed the necessity and obstacles of China's
fossil energy reform. In order to further studies, numerous scholars
have begun to analyze the economic and social impact of energy sub-
sidies from different perspectives. On the one hand, increasing re-
searches have been reported about the impact of policy measures on
energy subsidies. The main simulation methods used widely in these
studies included CGE model [6,7], Optimal control method [8,9] and I-
O model [10,11]. It is worth mentioning that Liu and Li [5] concluded
fossil energy subsidies reform would exert uncertain impacts on the
economy, society and environment using CGE models. Besides, Lin and
Chen [12] adopted Synthetic Control Method to evaluate the treatment
effect of IBEP policy on reducing residents’ electricity demand and
electricity subsidies. On the other hand, numerous studies have in-
vestigated the rebound effect of energy subsidies in China. Shao et al.
[13] found that mitigating the energy rebound effect can significantly
reduce carbon emissions. Li et al. [14] focused on how the energy
subsidies reform could mitigate the rebound effect in China, and how to
achieve economic and environmental gains. Li [15] adopted a modified
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effects across China's economic sectors with the consideration of energy
subsidies. To study the impact of fossil subsidies reform on the rebound
effect in China, Li [16] conducted a comprehensive evaluation based on
a multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The re-
sults indicated the rebound effect would be effectively mitigated by
removing fossil energy subsides, but companied with significant nega-
tive impacts on the macro economy. However, Li and Sun [3] found
that carbon dioxide emissions could not be effectively reduced by
simply removing China’s fossil fuel subsidies.
There is little literature on natural gas subsidies, especially the
analysis on influencing factors of changes in subsidies. Liu and Lin [17]
investigated the changes in the scale of natural gas subsidy in China and
its decomposition factors, and the results indicated that pricing me-
chanism, price and consumption had an impact on the change in nat-
ural gas subsidies. Specifically, the influencing factors of the changes in
natural gas subsidies were analyzed at the national level in their paper.
However, the fact that the effect of these factors on subsidies might be
characterized by time-phased, industry differences and regional het-
erogeneity was neglected. It is well known that natural gas is a regional
energy source. In fact, China is so vast that economic development and
consumption level differ greatly in regions, which entails price variance
of natural gas and thus diverse subsidies at regional level. It is necessary
to analyze and compare the regional heterogeneity of natural gas sub-
sidies. This study will be a useful reference for the government to enact
reasonable and targeted subsidy reform measures.
This paper tries to investigate the industry differences and regional
heterogeneity in the decomposition analysis of the change in natural
gas. We select China's industrial sector to do this research. Price-gap
approach and LMDI methods are combined to complete the decom-
position analysis from the perspective of the national level, regional
level, and provincial level. The research route of this paper is to in-
vestigate the industry differences in the decomposition analysis at the
national level and then to investigate the regional heterogeneity at both
the regional and provincial level using provincial panel data.
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature lies in the
following three aspects.
Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to esti-
mate China’s energy subsidies at the provincial level. There are great
differences in economic development and energy structure in China’s
provinces. For developing countries with unbalanced regional eco-
nomic development, energy subsidy reform also has regional problems.
Therefore, regional differences should be considered in the study of
energy subsidies and subsidy reform. The existing studies mainly focus
on estimating the scale of energy subsidies and the impact of removing
fossil fuel subsidies, ignoring regional differences. This paper discusses
the regional differences of energy subsidies at the provincial level,
which provides a new perspective for researchers in this field.
Secondly, considering the regional differences of China's economy
and the differences of natural gas consumption levels in different
places, this paper decomposes the variation of natural gas subsidy
progressively in order from the national, regional and provincial levels.
In addition, we have decomposed natural gas subsidies in different in-
dustries at the national level. When dealing with the energy problems of
countries with unbalanced regional development, the analysis method
adopted in this study can be used as a reference for other scholars.
Finally, we further discuss regional heterogeneity in the decom-
position of energy subsidies from the perspective of the regional and
provincial levels. Our study demonstrates that there exists regional
heterogeneity in the decomposition analysis of natural gas subsidies. In
the context of climate change, fossil energy subsidies are a global
problem. As we all know, natural gas is a regional energy source. There
exist a few regional problems in natural gas subsidy, such as how to
guide the rational allocation of energy resources among regions. Hence,
the regional heterogeneity of natural gas studied in this paper is not a
unique problem in China, but maybe the issue in the world, even if the
case studied in this paper is in China. In other words, the findings in our
study can be extended to emerging and developing countries due to the
similar issue of fossil fuel subsidies, especially for countries with un-
balanced regional development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we have
the literature review related to energy subsidies. Section 3 introduces
the empirical approach and describes the data sources, including how
to estimate the scale of subsidies and decompose the influencing fac-
tors. Section 4 presents the empirical results and corresponding ana-
lysis. Conclusions and policy recommendations are presented in Section
5.
2. Literature review
The term 'subsidy' has been subject to many interpretations, espe-
cially as regards energy subsidies [18]. How to define subsidies is the
first step in doing research on energy subsidies. In common parlance,
subsidy refers to the payment or tax concession from the government.
Corden [19] extended the concept to include in addition market
transfers-that is, transfers from consumers to producers resulting from
government interventions such as tariffs or price controls. The United
Nations and International Energy Agency [20] define an energy subsidy
as “any measure that keeps prices for consumers below market levels,
or for producers above market levels, or that reduces costs for con-
sumers and producers”. According to Kojima and Koplow [21], a sub-
sidy was defined as “a financial contribution by a government, or agent
of a government, that confers a benefit on its recipients” by The World
Trade Organization.
According to the above definition, Energy subsidies vary in different
and complex ways. Governments can transfer debt, reduce government
revenue, provide goods or services below market value, or provide vi-
able price support for energy technology, all of which fall within the
scope of subsidies [22]. Morgan [23] indicated that there exist about 17
different types of energy subsidies for many countries worldwide, with
most of them oriented towards lowering the cost of energy production,
some raising prices for producer and still others lowering prices for
users. global energy subsidies can reach into trillions of dollars a year in
accordance with the evidence in Sovacool [24].
With the increasing global concern over environmental and climate
issues, energy subsidies have become the most controversial and poli-
tical focus in international politics, energy enterprises and academic
circles. Discussion on this issue in academic circles began as early as the
1990s. Rajagopalan and Demaine [25] studied the relative benefits of
the use of electricity in the semi-arid region of Andhra Pradesh and the
result shows that electric pumps have cost advantages over diesel en-
gines, given the low operational costs arising from high subsidies. An-
derson [26] several countries of Western Europe subsidized coal pro-
duction, and most East European countries subsidized coal
consumption, which entailed more environmental pollution. Radetzki
[27] concluded that because production costs in Western Europe are
much higher than import prices, local production requires high sub-
sidies. Therefore, removing these subsidies will force the coal industry
to shut down and increase coal imports. Reynolds [28] argued that
there was an entropy subsidy loss phenomenon when industry replace a
high-grade energy resource with a low-grade energy resource without
technical progress. The entropy subsidy might cause energy prices to
rise higher than expected.
With the continuous deterioration of global environmental pollu-
tion, research on energy subsidy has gradually emerged in academic
circles. Firstly, some researchers attempted to estimate the complex
relationship between energy subsidies and carbon emissions in China.
Larsen [22] investigated world fossil fuel subsidies and global carbon
emissions by applying a simple model with interfuel substitution, using
a more detailed sectoral data set that includes energy prices and con-
sumption for an expanded sample of countries. The author concluded
that substantial fossil fuel subsidies prevailed in a handful of large
carbon-emitting countries and removing these subsidies would possibly
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reduce global carbon emissions by 7 percent. Choi et al. [29] studid if a
share of the gasoline tax revenue is reinvested to subsidize biofuel
production, economy-wide resource consumptions and emissions from
the fossil fuel-related supply chains would decrease. Mojik [30] pre-
sented a brief overview of measures implemented in the Slovak Re-
public and the potential impact of various mitigation options in the
energy sector. The results indicated that the country could achieve
considerable emissions reduction depending on the measures applied.
However, Li and Sun [3] completed an overall estimation for China's
fossil fuel subsidies by each energy type and concluded that CO2 miti-
gation cannot be achieved effectively only by removing fossil fuel
subsidies. Burtt and Dargusch [31] analyzed the cost-effectiveness of
household photovoltaic systems in reducing greenhouse gas emissions
in Australia by linking subsidies with emission reductions.
In addition, the impact of energy subsidy reform on social welfare or
households is also one of the debated issues in academia. Freund and
Wallich [32] assessed the welfare effects of energy subsidy reform in
Poland. Rentschler [33] estimated the regional variability of direct
welfare effects of removing fuel subsidies in Nigeria, and highlighted
the importance of understanding differences in vulnerability, and de-
signing tailored social protection schemes which ensure public support
for subsidy reforms. Feng and Hubacek [34] analyzed the impact of
energy price hikes on different income groups using an energy-extended
input-output approach, and the results showed that higher-income
groups benefit more from low energy prices than low-income groups
when tracing both direct and indirect effects of energy price variations.
Thirdly, in recent years, the research on the relationship between
energy subsidies and rebound effect has been gradually deepened and
refined. Li and Lin [35] incorporated endogenous energy efficiency into
the model specification of rebound effect and highlighted the policy
application via combining energy subsidies and technological progress
with a rebound effect. Jin and Kim [36] presented a new approach for
assessing energy rebound effect given the fossil-fuel subsidies and the
results showed that there was a 1% rebound effect in most of the years.
Li and lin [37] presented a detailed analysis of energy rebound effects
in China's economy via the input-output model and further investigated
the impacts of fossil-fuel subsidies on rebound effects.
Plenty of studies on China's energy subsidies have been reported
over the past decade. The first scholar to pay attention to energy sub-
sidies was Lin Boqiang [4], who described the inefficiency and unfair-
ness of China's energy subsidies for the first time in 2009. Subsequently,
Liu and Li [5] gradually contacted and studied the reform of fossil
energy subsidies, and analyzed the necessity and obstacles of fossil
energy reform. With the deepening of research, more and more litera-
ture focused on the impact of energy subsidies on the economy, society
and residents from different perspectives. On the other hand, increasing
researches have been reported about the impact of policy measures on
energy subsidies and the main simulation methods used widely by them
included CGE model [6,7], Optimal control method [8,9] and I-O model
[10,11]. It is worth mentioning that Liu and Li [5] illustrated fossil
energy subsidies reform would exert uncertain impacts on the economy,
society, and environment with using CGE models. Besides, Synthetic
Control Method (SCM) was used to evaluate the treatment effect of IBEP
policy on reducing residents’ electricity demand and subsidies in Lin
and Chen [12]. On the other hand, many scholars focused on the re-
bound effect and its impact on energy subsidies in China. Shao et al.
[13] found that mitigating the energy rebound effect can significantly
reduce carbon emissions. Differing from the existing literature, Toroghi
and Oliver [38] developed a novel method for estimating the rebound
effect for rooftop PV based on economic and geographic information
systems modeling. Su [39] indicated that household income, indoor
floor area, and owning the house had positive influences on electricity
consumption and the rebound effect was large for air conditioner and
refrigerator in Taiwan. Li et al. [14] focused on how the energy sub-
sidies reform could mitigate the rebound effect in China, and how to
achieve economic and environmental gains. Li [15] adopted a modified
input-output model to estimate the economy-wide energy rebound ef-
fects across China's economic sectors with the consideration of energy
subsidies. Further, to explore how China's fossil subsidies reform would
affect rebound effect, Li [16] conducted a comprehensive evaluation
based on a multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.
The results indicated the rebound effect would be effectively mitigated
by removing fossil energy subsidies, but companied with significant
negative impacts on the macro economy. However, Li and Sun [3]
found that carbon dioxide emissions could not be effectively reduced by
simply removing China’s fossil fuel subsidies due to the substitution
from low-emitted fuels to high-emitted coal and from capital and labor
to energy.
From the aforementioned review, although plenty of prior studies
have considered the issues of energy subsidy, most of them mainly have
focused on estimating the scale of energy subsidies, the macro/micro-
economic impact of removing subsidies, as well as the rebound effects
of energy subsidy reform and the inconclusive relationship between
energy subsidies and carbon emission intensity. To the best of our
knowledge, few existing studies have conducted the subsidy of the
natural gas industry, especially from the perspective of the change in
subsidy scale and its influencing factors. With the development of low-
carbon economy, China's natural gas consumption has increased ra-
pidly, which has attracted the attention of the government. According
to the China Natural Gas Development Report 2019 [40], China's nat-
ural gas consumption reached 280.3 billion cubic meters in 2018, up
17.5 percent year on year, and its share in primary energy consumption
was 7.8%, up 2 percentage points year-on-year. More surprisingly, the
daily peak gas consumption exceeded 1 billion cubic meters for the first
time. The market-oriented reform of natural gas pricing mechanism was
enacted in China since 2013. It is doubtful whether the effects of the
policies differ from regions. The answer to this question is of great
significance to the studies on energy subsidy reform.
Currently, some literature on the issue of natural gas subsidy in
China can be found. Wang and Lin [41] estimated the scale of natural
gas subsidy in China during the 11th Five-Year Plan period from the
perspective of the industry. However, there is limited literature on the
mechanism and intensity of the impact of the fossil fuel market-oriented
reform on the scale of subsidies, let alone the factors affecting subsidies.
Most in line with our research topic, Liu and Lin [17] calculated the
natural gas subsidies in China from 2007 to 2015 and conducted a
decomposition. As we mentioned above, policy shocks tend to be
characterized by time-phased, industry differences and regional het-
erogeneity. This paper focuses on natural gas subsidies in the industrial
sector, which is the main natural gas consumption sector. In this paper,
we will use provincial panel data to study the issue to reveal the in-
dustrial differences and regional heterogeneity of natural gas subsidies.
3. Methodology and data source
3.1. The research framework
This paper seeks to investigate the regional heterogeneity in natural
gas subsidies of China's industrial sector. Price-gap approach and
logarithmic mean Divisia index method (LMDI) are combined to ac-
complish this study from national and regional perspectives. The re-
search route of this paper can be roughly divided into two steps. The
first step is to analyze the differences in natural gas subsidy scale and
decomposition analysis between the industrial sector and other two
sectors at the national level. The second step is to study the regional
heterogeneity of natural gas subsidy at both the regional and provincial
levels. For ease of viewing, the research framework is presented in
Fig. 1.
3.2. The Price-gap approach
The international methods for estimating the scale of energy
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subsidies mainly include15: (1) The price-gap approach (2) The snap-
shot approach (3) The producer subsidy equivalent (4) The consumer
subsidy equivalent (5) The specific project Approach (6) The effective
rate of assistance. These methods are commonly used in the world, but
differ greatly from each other. For convenience sake, the results are
presented in Table 1.
Comparing the six methods, the features of these methods are
summarized as follows:
(1) The price-gap approach (PGA) directly aims at the price of energy
products with low data requirements and simple calculation.
Combining with price elasticity, PGA can analyze the impact of the
cancellation of subsidies on energy consumption, and then measure
the impact of the cancellation of subsidies on economic efficiency.
Besides, this method has two good features: First, it directly aimed
at the price of energy products, and the calculation process is
simple, requiring relatively few and easily accessible data.
Secondly, the price difference method focuses on the impact of
government subsidies on the consumer side, so it is the preferred
tool for calculating the consumer side subsidies. Hence, due to data
availability issues, the price-gap approach is a pervasive method
used by Chinese scholars.
(2) The object of snapshot approach (SA) is the government's support
for the project, which can be used to calculate the scale of subsidies
on both production side and consumption side. However, this
method has some limitations. For example, the validity of cross-
sectional data depends on the time series distribution of the data; in
addition, the snapshot method amortizes capital expenditure or loss
in a year, lacking consideration of capital fluctuations between
different years, resulting in inaccurate estimates.
(3) PSE or CSE are both data-intensive methods, which can capture the
impact that cannot be directly reflected in the price, but they re-
quire a high level of data.
(4) PSA can also analyze the transfer of subsidies, but it is difficult to
solve the final price distortion problem.
(5) The effective rate of assistance (ERA) is the most comprehensive,
theoretically covering all information of subsidies, but the analysis
process is very cumbersome, and the data required for the actual
operation process is extremely difficult to obtain.
(6) In summary, the most suitable method for calculating subsidy in our
research is Price-gap approach considering the issue of data avail-
ability and the features of our research object.
An appropriate estimation method is of great significance for ac-
curately estimating China's fossil energy subsidies. The price of natural
gas in China has long been controlled by the government, which mostly
subsidizes the consumption side. Considering the availability of data in
China, like many studies on China's subsidy [3,42,41], we adopt the
price-gap approach to estimate natural gas subsidies. The theoretical
basis of the price-gap approach was put forward by [43], and was
subsequently recognized and widely used internationally [22,44,45].
The basic thought of the price-gap approach is described as follows: the
energy subsidy policy can depress the end-consumer price and thus
promotes energy consumption. Therefore, the scale of energy subsidy
can be estimated by calculating the difference between the market re-
ference price without subsidies and the end-consumer price of energy
products under the subsidy. The advantage of the price-gap approach
lies in the direct connection with the price of energy products, which is
relatively simple to calculate and has no strict requirement for data.
The following formula presents the detailed mechanism for using
the price-gap approach to calculating natural gas subsidies [44]:
Fig. 1. The research framework.
15 Li H. Equity, Efficiency and Sustainable Development-China's Energy
Subsidy Reform Theory and Policy Practice. Bei Jing: China Economic
Publishing House; 2011.
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where i and t represent sectors and periods respectively, which is
consistent in the above formula. For example, Sit presents the subsidy in
sector i in period t. MP is the market reference price of natural Gas; EP
is the end-consumer price of natural gas; and C is the natural gas
consumption. The core of applying price-gap approach is how to define
market reference price (MP) and end-consumer price (EP). The meaning
of MP and EP and the corresponding calculation method will be ex-
plained in detail in Section 3.3.
3.3. Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI)
The most common index decomposition model in academia is the
Index Decomposition Analysis (IDA), which was first used by re-
searchers to study electricity consumption trends in industry in the
early 1980s [46]. Representative examples were the studies on ana-
lyzing the trends in industrial energy use in the UK [47] and US [48]
respectively. IDA has been widely applied in energy studies since it was
first used to analyze industrial electricity consumption. About 90
journal papers up to 1999 in conjunction with IDA were found in Ang &
Zhang [49]. The popular decomposition methods among analysts can
be divided into two groups: methods linked to the Laspeyres index and
methods linked to the Divisia index [50]. Prior to 1990, decomposition
analysis was conducted largely based on the concept of the Laspeyres
index [50]. In the 1990s, a gradual shift towards the Divisia index was
observed, or more specifically towards the method proposed by Boyd
et al. [51]. Currently, the most popular IDA approach has been the
logarithmic mean Divisia index (LMDI) methods since it was formally
presented by Ang and Liu [52]. The LMDI method has almost possessed
dominance in the IDA journal articles over the past decade [46], since it
has the desirable properties of perfect decomposition and consistency in
aggregation [52]. According to Ang and Liu [52], perfect decomposi-
tion can obtain the decomposition results without a residual term. In
addition, consistency in aggregation allows estimates for sub-groups to
be aggregated in a consistent manner.
The LMDI methods can be divided into two different methods
(LMDI-I and LMDI-II) according to different weights used in aggrega-
tion [46,53], LMDI-I has been widely used, due to its simpler formula
and perfect consistent in aggregation, in the studies on factors influ-
encing CO2 emission in China [54], driving forces of Iran's CO2 emis-
sions [55], impacts of energy consumption and treatment technology on
SO2 emissions [56], as well as changes in carbon intensity [10]. In order
to mathematically analyze our study, Mathematical deduction and
proof of LMDI approach to decomposition analysis are required. Con-
sidering the space limitation, the mathematical derivation is presented
in Appendix A.
So, the LMDI method can help potential users to make reasonable
judgement and decisions when implementing it in their studies. Hence,
In this study, we adopt this LMDI method, which possesses the desirable
properties as a decomposition method, to analyze the influencing fac-
tors of the change in natural gas subsidy scale and its decomposition. In
our research, the main influencing factors studied are market reference
price (MP), pricing mechanism (SR) and consumption (C). Specifically,
we calculate the variation of natural gas subsidy explained by the in-
fluencing factors and the corresponding contribution rate. The deriva-
tion of the LMDI model used in our paper is shown below.
Initially, Eq. (1) can be transformed into the following form:
= × = × ×S MP EP C MP EP
MP
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Eq. (3) can be obtained by taking logarithms on both sides of Eq. (2)
as follows:
= + +S SR MP Cln ln ln lnit it it it (3)
Making a mathematical transformation as follow:
























































From Eqs. (2)–(4), the changes in subsidies can be decomposed as
Eq. (5):
Table 1
A comparison of the basic concepts of six approaches.
Approaches Concepts or definitions Literature
PGA Estimated by calculating the difference between the market reference price without subsidies and the end-consumer price of energy products
under the subsidy.
Corden (1957)
SA Estimating the subsidy scale of an energy project by selecting cross-sectional data of a year Steenblik (1955)
PSE/CSE Defining a nominal amount of cash transferred to domestic producers (or consumers), which is equivalent to the value of all existing government
subsidies, given the current level of output, consumption and trade. PSE measures the production-side subsidies, while CSE describes the effect
of subsidies on lowering end-user prices.
IEA (2000)
PSA Estimating the scale of energy subsidies for a specific project. Firstly, estimate the various subsidies covered by a specific project, and then sum
up the various subsidies of the project to get the scale of subsidies.
Corden (1998)




Note: Table shows the definitions of these methods for estimating the scale of subsidies. And the corresponding abbreviations is listed as below:
(1) The price-gap approach (PGA).
(2) The snapshot approach (SA).
(3) The producer subsidy equivalent (PSE).
(4) The consumer subsidy equivalent(CSE).
(5) The specific project Approach (SPA).
(6) The effective rate of assistance (ERA).
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where i and t represent sectors and periods respectively in the above
formula. Hence, Sit is the subsidy in sector i in period t. MP is the
market reference price of natural gas equivalent to the reference price
of natural gas without subsidy in China; SR is the natural gas subsidy
rate, which is used to measure the effect of the pricing mechanism; C is
the natural gas consumption, implying the impact of consumption on
the variation of subsidies scale. SRcontri, MPcontri, Ccontri represent
the contribution rate of three decomposition factors (SR, MP and C) to
the variation of natural gas subsidy, re-
spectively. SR MP C, , represent the decomposition amount of three
influencing factors.
3.4. Indicator processing and data sources
As mentioned above, the key to applying the price-gap approach is
how to define market reference prices (MP) and end-consumer prices
(EP). The economic connotation of the market reference prices (MP) is
the economic cost per unit of energy consumption. It is the final price
that corresponds to the border price of internationally traded energy
products and is adjusted according to transportation and distribution
costs. It reflects the prices of commodities traded in competitive in-
ternational markets. The economic connotation of the end-consumer
price (EP) is the actual consumer price of an energy product, usually
measured in terms of its average price in a major consumer market. The
price gap, a measure of the degree to which energy subsidies distort the
price of energy products, can be calculated after determining the MP
and EP. Therefore, in this paper, the subsidy rate (SR = MP-EP/MP) is
adopted as the operating index of the natural gas pricing mechanism.
In this paper, we use the national average benchmark price as the
market reference price (MP). The national average benchmark price
(AP) is a weighted average of the domestic benchmark price (DP) and
the import benchmark price (IP), weighted by the respective con-
sumption proportion of domestic and imported natural gas. How to
calculate the domestic benchmark price is quite different in academia
because natural gas prices in different regions have changed sig-
nificantly, which is different from oil prices. We dealt with the domestic
benchmark price in the same way as Lin and Liu [57]. Specifically, we
use the provincial gate price for incremental gas (Pig) plus the dis-
tribution cost (dc) as the domestic benchmark price. And the incre-
mental price before 2013 was calculated based on the price growth rate
of international fuel oil (60%) and liquefied petroleum gas (40%). Ac-
cording to Liu and Lin [17], this paper handled the corresponding in-
dicators as follows. The distribution cost equaled to the terminal con-
sumer price (cpter) minus the provincial gate price of stock gas (Pprov·sg).
In addition, the import benchmark price (IP) equaled the imported
natural gas prices on CIF basis (Pig/CIF) plus the transportation cost (tc).
In order to present the above index processing clearly, equations are
added to explain the linkage, it is illustrated as:













where, w1 and w2 denote the weight, weighted by the respective con-
sumption proportion of domestic and imported natural gas. And other
indicators are marked in the original paragraph.
The data for provincial gate price comes from National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The natural gas prices
to end-consumer can be separated into the industrial, residential and
commercial sector. The data on consumption of natural gas in three
sectors are from China Entrepreneur Investment Club (CEIC). The
average natural gas prices in 36 Chinese cities were used as the end-
consumer prices (EP). The data of these cities were obtained from CEIC.
The data on imported natural gas prices and consumption were derived
from the development report of domestic and foreign oil and gas in-
dustry. In addition, the data of imported natural gas before 2010 was
calculated using the average annual growth rate obtained from Chinese
general administration of customs.
In terms of research on provincial natural gas subsidies, we took the
industrial natural gas sector of 26 provinces16 in China as the research
subject and adjusted the period to 2007–201617. China's average annual
market reference price was used as the market reference price (MP) for
estimating the subsidy of natural gas in the industrial sector of each
province. The end-consumer price (EP) of natural gas in the industrial
sector of 26 provinces was replaced by the used price of natural gas in
the provincial capital cities. The data of the price for the provincial
capital came from the end-user prices of natural gas in the industrial
sector in 36 major cities in China. The data of the end-user prices of 36
major cities in China were obtained from CEIC. The natural gas con-
sumption in the industrial sector in 26 provinces came from China's big
data research platform for economic and social development. In addi-
tion, partial missing data are obtained by scatter point trend fitting
method. To avoid the influence of inflation of currency, this paper used
the consumer price index to deflate the nominal values to the 2017
constant price.
China's natural gas prices have been regulated by the government
following the basic principle of “cost-plus” for a long time. The cost-
plus means that prices are determined by production costs and rea-
sonable profits, entailing the phenomenon that the consumer price is
clearly below market prices. According to the enactment of notice to
adjust the price of natural gas by the National Development and Reform
Commission18, the link of natural gas price management has been ad-
justed from the factory to urban gate station. Since then, the pricing
mechanism has changed from the cost-plus method to the market net
return method. The pricing mechanism of urban gate station price has
two main steps.
The first step is to determine the pricing benchmark (central
market). Considering the resource flow, consumption and pipeline
distribution of China's natural gas market, Shanghai market is selected
as the pricing benchmark. The second step is to establish a mechanism
for linking gate station price in the central market to the price of al-
ternative energy. Natural gas gate station price in the central market is
determined by a principle. The principle is that natural gas gate station
price in the central market is slightly lower than that of alternative
energy with equal calorific value. Specifically, alternative energy
sources are fuel oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), with weights of
60% and 40%, respectively. The price of alternative energy with equal
calorific value is calculated as weighted average of fuel oil and liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) unit calorific value prices. Meanwhile, in order to
maintain the competitive advantage of natural gas, and encourage users
to consume natural gas reasonably, natural gas gate station price is
temporarily calculated at 90% of the price of alternative energy. The
calculation formula is as follows:
= × × × + × × × +P K P H H P H H R( / / ) (1 )gas fo gas fo lpg gas lpg
wherePgasis the natural gas gate station price in the central market. K
represents the discount coefficient and tentatively set at 0.9.
and denotes the weights of fuel oil and LPG at 60% and 40%, re-
spectively. PfoandPlpgare the price of imported fuel oil and liquefied
16 Due to the availability of data, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, and
Tibet were excluded.
17 Limited by consumption data at the provincial level, the subsidies can only
be estimated until 2016.
18 http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201112/t20111227_452929.html.
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petroleum gas (LPG) respectively calculated by the customs during the
pricing period. Hfo, HlpgandHgasare the net calorific value (low calorific
value) of fuel oil, liquefied petroleum gas and natural gas, taking
10,000 kcal/kg, 12,000 kcal/kg and 8000 kcal/m3, respectively. R is
the value-added tax rate for natural gas in China, currently 13%.
4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Analysis of natural gas subsidy based on national perspective
4.1.1. Overview of natural gas subsidies in China
The price of natural gas in the industrial sector is the highest, fol-
lowed by the commercial sector, and the lowest is in the residential
sector. As clearly shown in Table 2, the price of natural gas in industrial
sector was 0.33 USD/m3 in 2007, 0.05 USD/m3 more than that in the
residential sector. However, the gap had risen to 0.11 USD/m3 in 2017,
which indicated that the cross-subsidy of natural gas in residential
sector was still relatively serious. Natural gas subsidy and respective
subsidy rates in three sectors of China during 2007–2017 are shown in
Table 2. As presented in Table 2, thanks to the reform of natural gas
prices, the average subsidy rates of natural gas in China's industrial
sector and commercial sector have decreased sharply, by 13.11% and
23.85% respectively. Although the value in the residential sector has
also declined slightly, the average subsidy rate of natural gas in the
residential sector has only dropped only by 2.35% to 27.35% in 2017.
In terms of the change in the total subsidy of natural gas, the natural gas
subsidies in China increased from 8.02 billion USD in 2007 to 12.79
billion USD. Natural gas subsidies in the residential sector tripled
during 2007–2017, accounting for 59.11% of the total subsidies in
2017. There are two possible explanations for the result. On the one
hand, Natural Gas Price Reform was not related to the residential
sector. On the other hand, it benefited from the implement of “coal to
gas” project.
We estimated the natural gas subsidy scale and subsidy rate during
2007–2017 showed in Fig. 2. It can be seen from Fig. 2 that the fluc-
tuation trend of natural gas subsidy rate and subsidy scale is basically
the same, with turning points in 2009, 2012 and 2016.
The first turning point in 2009: the international gas price fell
sharply in 2009, influenced by the shale gas revolution in the United
States and the fluctuation of international oil price. In the same year, a
rare snow and ice disaster occurred in China, which caused the rapid
expansion in domestic natural gas demand and the price rising of nat-
ural gas. These facts resulted in the dual decline of China's natural gas
subsidy rate and subsidy scale. But natural gas subsidies rebounded by
2010–2012 for the possible reason that China's natural gas consumption
was stimulated by the “four trillion CNY” plan. In the same period,
international oil prices began to rebound. In fact, Chinese natural gas
import and consumption have increased rapidly since the operation of
the first imported gas pipeline A of Central Asia-China at the end of
2009.
The second turning point in 2012: Chinese government began to
implement the reform of natural gas pricing mechanism since 2013. As
a result, natural gas subsidies in the industrial and commercial sectors
have been significantly reduced. The subsidy rate of the residential
sector was still relatively high after the subsidy fell slightly. The reason
was that Natural Gas Price Reform was not related to the residential
sector in the period.
The third turning point in 2016: In 2015, the Chinese government
finally realized the integration of the stock gas and the incremental gas,
and lowered the price by 0.11 USD/m3. However, the adjustment was
not transmitted to the terminal consumer price in time, which resulted
in the negative natural gas subsidy in the industrial sector and com-
mercial sector in a short term. However, the end-user prices fell slightly
in three sectors at the end of 2016. the price of imported natural gas has
risen sharply at the same period, with its average import price reaching
0.61USD/m3. These facts led to the rebound in subsidies. In addition, it
was noted that the natural gas subsidy scale of the residential sector
began to exceed that of the industrial sector since 2015.
4.1.2. Decomposition results in different sectors
In this section, we applied the price-gap approach and LMDI method
to estimate the variation and decomposition of natural gas subsidies
from the perspective of different sectors. The decomposition results are
shown in Figs. 3–5. Some interesting findings are from the comparison
of these decomposition results. Firstly, the trend of the change in sub-
sidy scale and decomposition of influencing factors in Figs. 3 and 4 are
quite similar, which indicates that the decomposition of natural gas
subsidies in the industrial and commercial sectors is similar during the
study period. Specifically, the pricing mechanism made the most sig-
nificant contribution to the changes in subsidies in these two sectors,
especially after the reform of pricing mechanism in 2013. The natural
gas subsidy in the industrial sector dropped sharply during 2014–2015.
The pricing mechanism contributed nearly 10.45 billion USD in the
decomposition, accounting for 96.01% of the total decline. In the same
Table 2








2007 Industrial 0.33 18.16% 4.46
Residential 0.28 29.70% 2.22
Commercial 0.28 31.49% 1.34
Total subsidies scales(billion USD) 8.02
2017 Industrial 0.49 5.05% 4.20
Residential 0.38 27.35% 7.56
Commercial 0.48 7.64% 1.03
Total subsidies scales(billion USD) 12.79
Note: Table shows natural gas subsidy and respective subsidy rates in three
sectors of China during 2007–2017.
Fig. 2. Natural gas subsidy scale and subsidy rate during 2007–2017. Note:
Figure shows the estimates of natural gas subsidy from 2013 to 2015 and its
subsidy rate using price-gap approach.
Fig. 3. Variation and decomposition of natural gas subsidies in China’s in-
dustrial Sector during 2007–2017.
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period, the contribution rate of the pricing mechanism in the residential
and commercial sectors are 79.02% and 98.12% respectively.
Secondly, the influence of price mechanism in the residential sector
in 2013 is not significant, far less than that in the other two sectors. One
possible reason is that the 2013 pricing mechanism reform did not in-
volve the use of natural gas in the residential sector. However, the
natural gas subsidies in the residential sector continued to decline in
2014–2016, which may contribute to the positive externalities of pri-
cing mechanism reform. Overall, the influences of price reform in the
residential sector was still weak compared with other sectors.
We decomposed the influencing factors of natural gas subsidy
changes in different industries in 2007–2013, 2013–2015 and
2015–2017, for the sake of the time-phased and industry differences in
energy subsidy reform. Fig. 6 illustrated the decomposition results of
the three sectors at different stages.
As shown in Fig. 6(a), the contribution rate of consumption in the
three sectors was the highest during 2007–2013. The contribution rate
of consumption in the commercial sector emerge highest, 98.01%,
followed by 82.12% in the industrial sector and 62.21% in the re-
sidential sector. One possible reason for this result is that with the rapid
development of urbanization in China, the domestic natural gas con-
sumption has increased significantly. China's natural gas consumption
rose from 70.5 billion cubic meters in 2007 to 170.5 billion cubic
meters in 2013.
Fig. 6(b) shows that the pricing mechanism played a major role in
promoting the decline of subsidies. Its contribution rates in the in-
dustrial, residential and commercial sectors are 101.21%, 87.31% and
115.22%, respectively. From 2013 to 2015, natural gas subsidies in
industrial, residential and commercial sectors decreased by 8.38 billion
USD, 1.29 billion USD and 2.09 billion USD annually. The reason for
this result is that the government implemented a series of measures to
reform the natural gas market in this period. In 2013, the government
adjusted the management of natural gas prices from the factory to the
gate station and implemented the highest ceiling price management at
the gate station price. In September 2014, the gate station price of non-
resident stock gas was raised by 0.06 USD per cubic meter. In April
2015, the maximum gate price of incremental gas decreased by 0.07
USD per cubic meter, and the highest gate price of stored gas increased
by 0.006 USD per cubic meter in order to achieve the integration of
incremental gas and stock gas prices. The maximum gate price for non-
resident gas has been reduced by 0.11 USD per cubic meter since No-
vember 2015, and the non-resident gas price has been changed from the
maximum gate price management to the benchmark gate price man-
agement. As these reform policies and measures didn’t involve the gas
consumption in the residential sector, the contribution rate of pricing
mechanism of the residential sector was the lowest compared with
other two sectors.
Fig. 6(c) showed the decomposition of the three sectors during
2015–2017. Unlike the previous two stages, the pricing mechanism in
this stage was still the most contributing factor in the industrial sector
and commercial sector, with a contribution of 104.34% and 145.26%
respectively. But the biggest decomposition factor of the residential
sector was consumption, which contributed 84.31%.
The reasons for this result may lie in two aspects: first, the gov-
ernment continued to deepen the market-oriented reform of natural gas
pricing mechanism (shown in 5th paragraph of section1), guiding the
rational allocation and consumption of resources, which resulted in a
rebound in natural subsidies in the industrial and commercial sectors.
Secondly, during this period, the government implemented the coal to
gas project, especially the clean heating in northern rural areas, which
greatly increased the consumption of residents. These reasons explained
the rebound of the subsidy reform during 2015–2017. The subsidy scale
of the three sectors increased by 15.97 billion USD, 8.06 billion USD
and 3.71 billion USD respectively. It also provided an explanation for
the inflection point in 2016 mentioned in Section 1.
4.2. Analysis of natural gas subsidy in the industrial sector from a regional
perspective
The previous two sections discussed the time-phased and industry
differences of subsidy decomposition. This section uses provincial panel
data to analyze the regional heterogeneity of subsidy decomposition.
Price-gap approach and LMDI methods are combined to complete the
decomposition analysis to investigate the regional heterogeneity at both
the regional and provincial level using provincial panel data. In this
section, we study the industrial gas subsidies in 26 provinces during
2007–2016 and these provinces are grouped into four regions including
Northeast, Eastern, Central and Western regions (seen in Table 3).
4.2.1. Results at regional level
(1). Discussion on the subsidies variation in different regions.
It is necessary to compare the subsidy situation of different regions
at different time points for the sake of analyzing the regional hetero-
geneity. Fig. 7 presents the subsidies situation of industrial natural gas
in four regions in China in 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016, including the
scale of subsidies and the corresponding average subsidies rate in each
region. The subsidies in the four regions were all positive, and the order
of subsidies was basically the same each year. The order from big to
small was the western region, eastern region, central region and
northeast region. However, only the western region had significant
positive subsidies, while the other three regions had negative valuations
by 2016. Overall, the scale of industrial natural gas subsidies presents a
high trend in the west and low in the east. One possible explanation was
that changes in subsidies scale are related to end-consumer prices in
different regions. As shown in Fig. 8, comparatively speaking, the end-
consumer price of industrial natural gas in western region has always
been the lowest, which could entail the high subsidy rate. In 2007, the
end-consumer price in the western region was only about 0.28 USD,
while the prices in the other three regions were higher than 0.38 USD. It
is worth noting that there are negative subsidies in the three regions
Fig. 4. Variation and decomposition of natural gas subsidies in China’s com-
mercial sector during 2007–2017.
Fig. 5. Variation and decomposition of natural gas subsidies in China’s re-
sidential sector during 2007–2017.
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except for the western region in 2016, which may be attributed to the
rationalization of the price structure of natural gas in these areas, re-
sulting in a significant increase in the utilization efficiency of natural
gas. The results indicate to some extent that China's natural gas market-
oriented reform has achieved remarkable results in non-residential
sectors since the government implemented the reform of pricing me-
chanism in 2013.
(2). Analysis on decomposition results in different regions
During 2007–2013, the subsidies of the industrial sectors in the four
regions (northeastern, eastern, central, and western regions) all ex-
perienced significant growth. The highest subsidy growth rate was
274.04% in the central region, followed by 265.23% in the eastern
region and 149.34% in the western region, and 98.36% in the northeast
region was the lowest. Fig. 9 demonstrated the decomposition analysis
in the industrial sector in the two periods before and after the reform in
2013.
As shown in Fig. 9(a), during 2007–2013, consumption was the
most significant factor contributing to the decomposition of natural gas
subsidies in the industrial sector. During the period, consumption
contributed more than 80% to the eastern and northeastern regions,
followed by 70.66% in the western region and 69.54% in the central
region. A large amount of natural gas consumption was needed in China
at this period due to the rapid industrialization. Consumption is the
main driving factor for the growth of subsidies for natural gas in the
industrial sector.
In Fig. 9(b), during 2013–2016, the pricing mechanism played a
significant positive role in the decline of industrial natural gas sub-
sidies. The effect of the pricing mechanism on the changes in subsidies
differed in regions. Its contribution rates were 367.73% in the north-
eastern region, 80.64% in the eastern region, 75.68% in the central
region and 74.34% in the western region. During the study period,
natural gas subsidies in the industrial sector declined sharply with the
largest decrease in the northeast and the east, followed by the central
region and the lowest in the west. One explanation was that the gov-
ernment began to implement the reform of natural gas pricing me-
chanism in non-residential sectors since 2013 and its provincial gate
price began to be linked to the market price of alternative energy
sources in perfect competition. As a result, the end-consumer price of
natural gas in the industrial sector rose several times in 2013–2017. It is
worth noting that the pricing mechanism gave full play to its influential
effect in the decline of natural gas subsidies in the industrial sectors in
all regions, while consumption exerted the restraining effect in all re-
gions. Reference prices only played a restraining role in the north-
eastern region.
Fig. 6. Decomposition results in three sectors at
different periods. Note: We decompose the in-
fluencing factors of natural gas subsidy changes
in different industries in 2007–2013, 2013–2015
and 2015–2017, for the sake of the time-phased
and industry differences in energy subsidy re-
form. Figure illustrates the decomposition results
of three sectors at different three stages.
Table 3




Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Fujian Shandong Hainan
Central region (5)
Shanxi Anhui Henan Hubei Hunan
Western region (9)
Inner Mongolia Guangxi Sichuan Chongqing Shanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang
Source: The Seventh Five-Year Plan adopted by the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress of China in 1986.
B. Lin and Y. Kuang Applied Energy 260 (2020) 114329
10
4.2.2. Analysis results at provincial level
(1). Discussion on changes in the scale of subsidies
Table 4 shows the scale of natural gas subsidies in the industrial
sectors of 26 provinces during 2007–2016. The results present that
natural gas subsidies in different provinces have significant spatial
heterogeneity. The top five provinces are Sichuan, Chongqing, Xinjiang,
Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia in the scale of subsidies in 2007, all of
which belong to the western region. The top three subsidy scale ex-
ceeded 0.81 billion USD, and the subsidy scale in Sichuan's industrial
sector was as high as 1.53 billion USD. Next is the eastern region, where
the subsidies scale is relatively small at the level of 0.16–0.32 billion
USD, such as Hebei (10), Jiangsu (10), Hainan (12). In addition, the
subsidies scale in Shandong, Zhejiang and Fujian are all under 80.65
million USD. Subsidies in central provinces are the smallest. Except for
Henan (22), other places are extremely small. In particular, the total
subsidies in Shanxi, Hubei, Hunan and Anhui are less than 0.24 billion
USD.
What’s more, in the four municipalities directly under the Central
Government, except for Chongqing as mentioned above, the subsidy
scale of the other three municipalities is very small, with an average
scale of 64.52 million USD. The subsidies scale in the Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei region are mostly at the average level of 0.16 billion USD.
Overall, the subsidy levels of 26 provinces in 2007–2010 shows a
low trend in the East and high in the West. In the eastern region, only
Hebei and Jiangsu provinces have an average annual subsidy level of
more than 0.16 billion USD, while there is six in the western region.
Differences in the region began to narrow down after 2010. In terms of
time series, the fluctuation trend of subsidy changes in most provinces
is the same, with inflection points in 2009 and 2013. This trend is si-
milar to previous analysis of the changes in national natural gas sub-
sidies, which imply that industrial subsidies accounted for a large
proportion of the national natural gas consumption subsidies. In 2007,
the proportion of natural gas consumption in the industrial sector was
68.65%, which remained around 65.09% during 2007–2016.
One thing is worth to be discussed here. It seems that the above
results presented in Table 4 are conducted without considering eco-
nomic size of each province, when the subsidy absolute amount ana-
lyzed. Therefore, we provide another perspective of the analysis based
on economic size since economic bases differ in provinces. It is to make
a comparative analysis with the above result shown in Table 4.
Specially, we establish an index to measure the relative subsidy of
natural gas in each province. The index is designed to control the
possible impact of economic volume on the size of subsidies. The index




Fig. 7. Subsidies in different regions at different points in time. Note: Figure presents the subsidies situation of industrial natural gas in four regions in China in 2007,
2010, 2013 and 2016, including the scale of subsidies and the corresponding average subsidies rate in each region.
Fig. 8. Natural gas prices in industrial sectors in four regions at different points
in time. Note: Figure shows the end-consumer price of industrial natural gas in
four regions of China.
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Where, RSI denotes the relative subsidy index, S denotes the original
subsidy presented in Table 4, GDP denotes the economic volume of each
province. GDP data are from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
The recalculated results (RSI) are shown in Table 5. It shows the re-
lative scale of natural gas subsidies in the industrial sectors of 26 pro-
vinces with the consideration of economic size.
In terms of specific values, there are obvious differences between
Table 5 and Table 4. As seen from Table 5, The top five provinces are
Xinjiang, Ningxia, Chongqing, Hunan and Qinghai in 2007. In other
words, except Xinjiang and Chongqing, compared to Table 4, the others
fall out of the top five, but still remain in the top ten. Besides, the top
ten provinces remain largely unchanged in 2007 except that Henan was
replaced by Qinghai. The top 10 provinces still belong to the western
region which is consistent with that of Table 4. In general, the results
with the consideration of economic size are different from that in
Table 4. But it seems that the subsidies scale remains differ in provinces,
even after with the consideration of economic size. Also, it means that
the spatial heterogeneity of gas subsidies in different provinces still
exists. This comparative analysis shows that the economic size has an
impact on the ranking of natural gas subsidies at provincial levels, but it
would not change the basic conclusion of this study, that is, the ex-
istence of regional heterogeneity.
(2). Analysis on decomposition results
Table 4 showed the cumulative effects of various factors on natural
gas subsidy variation of 26 provinces during the entire study period19.
During this period, the cumulative variation of natural gas subsidies in
most provinces was negative. All provinces have declined to vary de-
grees except Shanxi, Qinghai and Xinjiang. This indicated that there
was regional heterogeneity in the variation and decomposition of nat-
ural gas subsidies in the industrial sector. We therefore conclude that
the contribution of these factors to the decomposition of natural gas
subsidies differ in provinces.
Next, we discuss the effects of various driving factors.
Price effect (MP): The scale of subsidies for natural gas in industrial
Fig. 9. Decomposition of natural gas subsidies in
industrial sectors in different regions before and
after the price reform in 2013. Note: Figure
shows the decomposition analysis in the in-
dustrial sector in the two periods before and
after the reform in 2013. (a) presents the de-
composition result during 2007–2013 and (b)
presents the decomposition result during
2013–2016.
Table 4
Scale of natural gas subsidies in the industrial sectors of 26 provinces in 2007–2016.
Regions Provinces 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Northeast region Liaoning −0.50 9.33 −10.50 −1.92 11.33 31.21 13.33 9.85 −6.06 −24.86
Jilin 6.51 11.15 6.64 11.20 9.44 15.00 16.02 7.53 −2.21 −1.35
Heilongjiang 11.68 29.22 1.60 12.20 32.24 18.99 5.72 −4.80 −15.34 −13.44
Eastern region Beijing 5.08 9.99 3.54 9.44 11.71 16.97 12.37 7.73 1.32 −0.66
Tianjin 4.25 11.58 1.92 9.41 20.57 27.16 23.36 15.55 6.10 −4.47
Hebei 10.54 25.60 14.58 24.08 31.61 37.82 28.05 15.25 3.25 3.05
Shanghai 3.72 9.15 −1.38 5.57 18.89 28.35 21.68 12.48 −1.03 –22.05
Jiangsu 10.49 28.27 3.28 23.62 48.79 76.35 65.11 45.44 1.36 −0.43
Zhejiang 2.77 5.37 −1.85 1.65 7.74 13.52 0.94 −17.34 −31.10 −25.04
Fujian 0.04 0.52 −0.39 1.20 2.05 4.77 1.87 −1.52 −8.60 −14.33
Shandong 5.29 12.08 −15.14 0.30 18.28 33.44 20.83 −4.85 −28.76 −43.79
Hainan 12.90 13.27 −7.50 4.14 36.51 35.67 27.07 22.85 8.48 −15.45
Central region Shanxi 5.24 8.71 7.10 11.17 20.07 30.18 27.63 21.56 9.68 −2.27
Anhui 1.88 3.69 1.82 6.28 11.49 16.29 14.90 5.78 −2.25 −4.12
Henan 22.01 40.98 10.89 21.04 36.52 79.67 67.30 35.97 5.38 −21.13
Hubei 3.81 7.26 1.76 6.81 14.30 20.42 13.60 8.34 −4.06 −15.32
Hunan 2.50 5.99 1.90 4.23 7.58 10.93 9.17 5.81 −0.85 −0.94
Western region Inner Mongolia 28.66 47.01 42.34 44.72 59.48 66.41 72.26 61.08 26.44 1.95
Guangxi −0.64 −0.04 −0.19 −0.36 −0.14 −0.23 −0.22 −1.29 −3.59 −6.46
Sichuan 95.73 151.10 78.52 166.65 171.47 146.94 216.42 148.84 86.67 75.58
Chongqing 51.80 78.94 43.40 65.32 86.49 84.84 49.81 36.33 −4.25 −6.47
Shanxi 26.45 61.61 22.84 47.03 66.33 76.98 84.43 85.69 70.96 41.47
Gansu 17.42 23.16 15.37 21.26 26.69 38.47 34.70 29.25 14.75 11.85
Qinghai 7.50 27.14 16.37 23.33 42.29 69.48 63.48 61.84 47.55 35.69
Ningxia 11.27 19.30 10.68 18.38 30.51 34.89 27.99 17.58 11.11 4.53
Xinjiang 54.58 97.18 48.70 92.94 159.58 180.09 180.64 257.42 163.39 74.20
Note: Table shows the scale of natural gas subsidies in the industrial sectors of 26 provinces in 2007–2016. Natural gas subsidies in different provinces have
significant spatial heterogeneity.
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sectors of most provinces have declined, and the price effect exerted a
little positive impact on the decline. Compared with other decomposi-
tion factors, price effect exerted restraining effect, especially in
Liaoning, Shandong, Sichuan provinces.
Pricing mechanism effect (SR): as seen in Table 6, pricing me-
chanism exerted an overall positive effect in the decline of the scale of
natural gas subsidies in the industrial sectors in all provinces but with
some fluctuations and regional heterogeneity. It could be seen that the
effect of pricing mechanism made a significant contribution to the re-
duction of subsidies in 22 provinces during the entire period. The ex-
pressive contribution rates among them are 346.64% in Liaoning,
463.89% in Hebei, 562.38% in Jiangsu, 368.21% in Hunan and
564.45% in Sichuan. As a result, it can be concluded that whether the
pricing mechanism is effectively implemented or not, pricing me-
chanism has a critical impact on the natural gas subsidies during the
entire period. This conclusion is consistent with the results of Liu and
Lin [17].
Consumption effect (C): during the entire period, just like price ef-
fect, consumption had a restraining impact on the subsidy decline in the
industrial sectors of 22 provinces. But the inhibitory effect and de-
composition of consumption are larger than the price factor on average
by about 0.23 billion USD.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
As the world's largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, China's
energy subsidy reform has attracted much attention widely. China's
natural gas consumption has increased sharply, accounting for about
15% of the growth in global natural gas consumption in 2017. Hence,
natural gas consumption in China has become the main source of in-
ternational natural gas demand growth. In view of the significant gap
between the economic development and energy consumption structure
of different provinces in China, we need to consider the regional het-
erogeneity in the study of natural gas subsidy,
This paper sought to investigate the industry differences and re-
gional heterogeneity of natural gas subsidies in China. The industrial
sector was selected for this study since it is the largest gas sector ac-
counting for more than 65% of natural gas consumption. Price-gap
approach and LMDI methods are combined to complete the study from
the perspective of national level, regional level, and provincial level.
The findings of this paper are summarized as follows:
There exist industry differences and phased features in the decom-
position at the national level. The contribution rate of consumption in
the three sectors (industrial, residential and commercial sector) during
2007–2013 was the highest. But during 2013–2015, natural gas sub-
sidies in the three sectors decreased sharply with an average annual
decrease of 8.38 billion USD, 1.29 billion USD and 2.09 billion USD
respectively. The pricing mechanism played a key positive role in the
decline of natural gas subsidies in the three sectors, with contributions
up to 101.21%, 87.31% and 115.22% respectively. This finding also
indicated that a series of price reform measures implemented by the
government since 2013 had achieved remarkable effects. However,
since the reform measures did not involve the residential sector, the
effect of the pricing mechanism on the residential sector was not ob-
vious. During 2015–2017, pricing mechanism was still exerting positive
effects both in the industrial sector and commercial sector, while con-
sumption was the largest contributor in the residential sector during the
period. One possible explanation for this is that the government cut the
gate prices of non-residential sectors, leading to an increase in the
consumption of natural gas by industrial and commercial sectors, which
in turn leads to a decline in the final consumer price and ultimately a
rebound in natural gas subsidies. By contrast, the rebound in gas sub-
sidies in the residential sector was attributed more to the “coal to gas”
program, which has significantly increased the consumption of natural
gas in the residential sector.
There was regional heterogeneity in the decomposition analysis in
Table 5
Relative scale index of natural gas subsidies in the industrial sectors of 26 provinces with the consideration of economic size.
Regions Provinces 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Northeast region Liaoning 0.00 0.07 −0.07 −0.01 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.03 −0.02 −0.11
Jilin 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.05 −0.02 −0.01
Heilongjiang 0.16 0.35 0.02 0.12 0.26 0.14 0.04 −0.03 −0.10 −0.09
Eastern region Beijing 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.00
Tianjin 0.08 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.10 0.04 −0.03
Hebei 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01
Shanghai 0.03 0.07 −0.01 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.00 −0.08
Jiangsu 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.00
Zhejiang 0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 −0.04 −0.07 −0.05
Fujian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.05
Shandong 0.02 0.04 −0.04 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.04 −0.01 −0.05 −0.06
Hainan 1.03 0.88 −0.45 0.20 1.45 1.25 0.85 0.65 0.23 −0.38
Central region Shanxi 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.08 −0.02
Anhui 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.03 −0.01 −0.02
Henan 0.15 0.23 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.27 0.21 0.10 0.01 −0.05
Hubei 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.03 −0.01 −0.05
Hunan 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00
Western region Inner Mongolia 0.45 0.55 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.34 0.15 0.01
Guangxi −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
Sichuan 0.91 1.20 0.55 0.97 0.82 0.62 0.82 0.52 0.29 0.23
Chongqing 1.11 1.36 0.66 0.82 0.86 0.74 0.39 0.25 −0.03 −0.04
Shanxi 0.46 0.84 0.28 0.46 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.39 0.21
Gansu 0.64 0.73 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.68 0.55 0.43 0.22 0.16
Qinghai 0.94 2.66 1.51 1.73 2.53 3.67 2.99 2.68 1.97 1.39
Ningxia 1.23 1.60 0.79 1.09 1.45 1.49 1.09 0.64 0.38 0.14
Xinjiang 1.55 2.32 1.14 1.71 2.41 2.40 2.14 2.78 1.75 0.77
Note: Table shows the relative scale of natural gas subsidies in the industrial sectors of 26 provinces with the consideration of economic size during 2007–2016. The
results show that the scale of natural gas subsidies remains differ in provinces, even though with the consideration of economic size.
19 Annual decomposition of each provinces has been accomplished in detail.
But it is showed in the appendix limited by the length of the article (see Table A
in Appendix).
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the industrial sectors at the regional level. Firstly, the subsidies of the
industrial sectors in the four regions (Northeast, Eastern, Central, and
Western regions) all experienced significant growth during 2007–2013.
The highest subsidy growth rate was 274.04% in the central region,
followed by 265.23% in the eastern region and 149.34% in the western
region, and 98.36% in the northeast region was the lowest. But the scale
of natural gas subsidies in the industrial sector in each region dropped
sharply since 2013, with the largest drop in the northeast and the east,
followed by the central region and the lowest in the west. Secondly,
during 2007–2013, consumption was the most significant factor con-
tributing to the decomposition of natural gas subsidies in the industrial
sector in all regions and exerted a positive influence on the growth of
natural gas subsidies. During the period, consumption contributed more
than 80% to the eastern and northeastern regions, followed by 70.66%
in the western region and 69.54% in the central region. On the con-
trary, during 2013–2016, the pricing mechanism played a significant
positive role in the decline of industrial natural gas subsidies. The effect
of the pricing mechanism on the changes in subsidies differed in re-
gions. Its contribution rates were 367.73% in the northeastern region,
80.64% in the eastern region, 75.68% in the central region and 74.34%
in the western region. This result presents that the pricing mechanism
reform implemented by the government in 2013 achieved remarkable
results. At the same period, consumption exerted the restraining effect
in all regions, while reference prices played a restraining role only in
Northeast region.
There exists regional heterogeneity in the industrial natural gas
subsidies and its decomposition analysis at provincial level in 2007. The
top five provinces with the highest subsidies are Sichuan, Chongqing,
Xinjiang, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia, all of which belong to the western
region. The second echelon was the eastern provinces, and the subsidies
scale of each province was as low as the level at 0.16–0.32 billion USD.
Natural subsidies in central provinces were the smallest. Overall, the
subsidy level of 26 provinces during 2007–2010 presented a
distribution trend of low in the East and high in the West. In the eastern
region, only the average annual subsidy scale of Hebei and Jiangsu
provinces were more than 0.16 billion USD, while there was six in the
western region. Differences in the region began to narrow after 2010.
The cumulative scale changes of natural gas subsidies in most provinces
are negative except for the three western provinces of Shanxi, Qinghai
and Xinjiang, other provinces had declined in varying degrees. This
indicated that there was regional heterogeneity in the factor decom-
position of change in natural gas subsidies in the industrial sector. The
pricing mechanism exerted overall positive effects in the decline of the
scale of natural gas subsidies in the industrial sectors in all provinces
but with some fluctuations. Price and consumption had a restraining
influence in the subsidy decline in the industrial sectors of 23 provinces
during 2007–2016. But the inhibitory effect and decomposition of
consumption are larger than the price factor.
Based on the aforementioned conclusions, three policy implications
are presented as follows:
Firstly, considering the industry differences, the market-oriented
reform of natural gas pricing mechanism needs to distinguish non-re-
sidential natural gas from residential natural gas. In the non-residential
gas sector, the government can let both suppliers and consumers trade
competitively in national oil and gas trading centers such as Shanghai
and Chongqing. The advantage of this approach lies in the spontaneous
formation of efficient market prices based on the supply and demand
market transactions, avoiding the market distortions caused by the
government's participation in natural gas pricing. Additionally, this
method is conducive for effective supervision and management of
market transactions. In the field of residential gas, it is difficult for the
terminal consumer price of residents to be fully marketed in a short
time due to the difference in the economic affordability of residents. A
suggestion is that the upstream gas price could be equal to the final
consumer price acceptable to the residents plus the transmission and
distribution cost and reasonable profit.
Table 6
Factor Decomposition Analysis of natural gas subsidy variation of 26 Provinces during entire study period.
Region Provinces Decomposition Contribution rate
△scale △MP △SR △C MPcontri SRcontri Ccontri
Northeast region Liaoning −24.36 43.43 −84.19 16.41 −178.29% 345.64% −67.35%
Jilin −7.86 2.35 −23.17 12.97 −29.85% 294.88% −165.03%
Heilongjiang −25.12 9.40 −30.90 −3.62 −37.43% 123.00% 14.43%
Eastern region Beijing −5.74 1.93 −13.48 5.82 −33.57% 234.91% −101.34%
Tianjin −8.72 −4.28 −20.59 16.15 49.12% 236.06% −185.18%
Hebei −7.48 5.70 −34.65 21.46 −76.14% 462.89% −286.74%
Shanghai −25.78 3.18 −40.57 11.61 −12.35% 157.41% −45.05%
Jiangsu −10.93 5.96 −61.46 44.57 −54.54% 562.38% −407.84%
Zhejiang −27.81 1.61 −16.92 −12.49 −5.77% 60.85% 44.92%
Fujian −14.37 1.96 −27.26 10.94 −13.61% 189.74% −76.13%
Shandong −49.08 40.41 −96.02 6.54 −82.33% 195.66% −13.32%
Hainan −28.35 −1.95 −27.40 1.00 6.89% 96.64% −3.53%
Central region Shanxi −7.52 0.71 −1.26 1.87 −3.16% 408.60% −305.44%
Anhui −6.00 1.64 −18.88 11.24 −27.39% 314.57% −187.18%
Henan −43.14 8.89 −86.17 34.13 −20.61% 199.73% −79.12%
Hubei −19.13 2.48 −26.22 4.61 −12.97% 137.06% −24.09%
Hunan −3.44 1.19 −12.65 8.02 −34.51% 367.79% −233.28%
Western region Inner Mongolia −26.71 6.99 −41.68 7.98 −26.17% 156.07% −29.89%
Guangxi −5.82 1.05 −6.08 −0.79 −17.98% 104.39% 13.59%
Sichuan −20.14 19.68 −113.69 73.87 −97.68% 564.39% −366.71%
Chongqing −58.27 22.20 −101.68 21.21 −38.10% 174.49% −36.39%
Shanxi 15.02 −4.67 −33.00 52.69 −31.09% −219.71% 350.79%
Gansu −5.57 1.88 −11.89 4.43 −33.78% 213.38% −79.61%
Qinghai 28.18 −7.59 −18.65 54.42 −26.92% −66.15% 193.07%
Ningxia −6.74 3.45 −17.50 7.31 −51.18% 259.64% −108.46%
Xinjiang 19.62 −12.98 −81.74 114.34 −66.17% −416.63% 582.80%
Note: Table shows the cumulative effects of various factors on natural gas subsidy variation of 26 provinces during entire study period
(2007–2016). SR MP C, , represent the decomposition amount of three influencing factors (SR, MP and C), respectively. SRcontri, MPcontri, Ccontri represent the
contribution rate of three decomposition factors (Pricing mechanism, Price and Consumption) to the variation of subsidy, respectively.
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Secondly, Natural gas subsidies have regional heterogeneity and
different regions have different gas pipeline transportation fees, re-
sulting in regional differences in terminal consumer prices. We propose
that the cost of pipeline transportation in a place can be divided into
two parts. The first is the cost determined by the distance between the
local pipeline network and the gas source, and the second is the cost
generated by the management fee of the local pipeline operation
company. According to the applicable scope of different pipeline pri-
cing in different regions, the “point-to-point” method can be used for
pilot regional reform. In addition, in the early stages, more developed
pipeline networks and mature market areas should be selected as pro-
vincial pilot areas. Pilot areas should design regional pipeline trans-
portation fees according to the overall layout of China's natural gas
market reform to mitigate the impact of price distortions caused by
regional heterogeneity. Overall, this study can be a useful reference for
China to rationally allocate regional energy subsidy reform tasks and
formulate corresponding regional subsidy policies.
Finally, based on the results, we suggest that policy measures en-
acted by the government should differ in regions when promoting
subsidy reform, especially for developing countries with unbalanced
regional development, such as China.
Of course, there are some constraints for employing this method.
From the Eqs. (3) and (4) in the paper, the LMDI formulae contain
logarithmic terms and the variables cannot have negative values. In
theory, however, the subsidy and subsidy rate indicators are likely to be
negative. A more likely situation is the occurrence of zero values. So,
this is a limitation of the LMDI method, as well as an inevitable con-
straint for the decomposition analysis employing this method.
In the context of climate change, fossil energy subsidies are a global
problem. As we all know, natural gas is a regional energy source. There
exist a few regional problems in natural gas subsidy, such as how to
guide the rational allocation of energy resources among regions. Hence,
the regional heterogeneity of natural gas studied in this paper is not a
unique problem in China, but may be the issue in the world, even if the
case studied in this paper is in China. In other words, the findings in our
study can be extended to emerging and developing countries due to the
similar issue of fossil fuel subsidies, especially for countries with un-
balanced regional development.
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Appendix A. . Mathematical proof: The LMDI approach to decomposition analysis20
A.1 Divisia integral index
The proposed method is derived from the Divisia index. For ease of understanding, we refer to the case of energy-related CO2 emissions for
industry. Assuming n industrial sectors and m fuel types, we may express the aggregate CO2 emissions (C) in terms of industrial production, energy
emission factor, fuel mix, and energy intensity:
= =
= = = =










i ij ij i
1 1 1 1 (A.1)
where Cij is the CO2 emissions for fuel j in sector i, Yi is the industrial output of sector i, Uij = Cij/Eij
is the emission factor of fuel j in sector i, Sij = Eij/Ei is the energy consumption share of fuel j in sector i (Eij is fuel j consumption and Ei the total
energy consumption, both in sector i), and Ii = Ei/Yi is the energy intensity of sector i.
To study how the aggregate emissions are affected by the factors on the right hand side of Eq. (A.1) over time, we take the logarithmic
differentiation of Eq. (A.1) with respect to time:
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Integrating Eq. (A.2) over the time interval [0, T] yields:
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Exponentiating Eq. (A.3) yields:
20 This proof is provided from Ang and Liu (2001), please refer to the original text for more details.
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A discrete approximation of Eq. (A.5) is needed in empirical studies. The following log-change
formula may be used:
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× ×
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where wi(t∗) is a weight function given by Eq. (A.4) at point t ∗ [0, T]. In Eq. (A.4), the precise point is not known. Boyd et al. [15] proposed the use of











This formulation has been called the Arithmetic Mean Divisia Index Method (AMDI).
This method has been adopted in many energy decomposition studies but it has the drawbacks of leaving a residual term and an inability to
handle zero values in the data set. The logarithmic mean of two positive numbers is defined as:
=L x y y x y x x y( , ) ( )/log( / ) for (A.7)
























This formulation is what we have referred to as the LMDI II. Although superior to the AMDI Method, this method is not consistent in aggregation.
With reference to Eq. (A.7), proposing the use of the aggregate total value as the item of weight. In the weight function, we may therefore take L
(Cij,0, Cij, T) as the logarithmic mean of the factorial value and
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= = = = = =
























It is shown in Section 2.3 that inserting Eq. (A.8) into Eq. (A.6) yields the following identity:
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Eq. (A.9) may be written as:
=D D D D D· ·tot pdn cmf mix int (A.10)
where Dtot = CT/C0 and the indices Dpdn, Demf, Dmix, and Dint are respectively the factorial effects associated with industrial production, fuel emission
factor, fuel mix, and energy intensity. The formulation based on Eq. (A.8)–(A.10) is our proposed method and will be referred to as the Log Mean
Divisia Index Method I (LMDI I). Its weight function is simpler than that of the LMDI II.
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A.3 Proof of perfect decomposition
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Due to space constraints, derivation process of the consistence in aggregation, another desirable property of the LMDI I method, is not provided
here, but can be found in Section 3 in Ang and Liu (2001). Besides, a practical guide to LMDI and quantity indicator for both additive and
multiplicative decomposition analysis is provided in Ang (2005).
Appendix B. . Factor decomposition on subsidy variation of provinces
See. Table B1.
Table B1
Annual factor decomposition of subsidy variation of 26 provinces from 2007 to 2016.
Provinces year △scale Decomposition Contribution rate
△MP △SR △C MPcontri SRcontri Ccontri
Beijing 2008 4.92 1.53 1.70 1.69 0.31 0.35 0.34
2009 −6.45 −1.60 −4.82 −0.03 0.25 0.75 0.00
2010 5.90 1.24 2.93 1.73 0.21 0.50 0.29
2011 2.28 1.85 0.96 −0.53 0.81 0.42 −0.23
2012 5.25 0.85 1.60 2.81 0.16 0.31 0.53
2013 −4.60 −0.82 −3.36 −0.41 0.18 0.73 0.09
2014 −4.65 −0.22 −4.45 0.02 0.05 0.96 0.00
2015 −6.40 −0.35 −6.57 0.52 0.05 1.03 −0.08
2016 −1.98 −0.55 −1.46 0.03 0.28 0.74 −0.01
Tianjin 2008 7.33 1.54 4.05 1.74 0.21 0.55 0.24
2009 −9.66 −1.38 −8.51 0.23 0.14 0.88 −0.02
2010 7.49 0.97 4.94 1.57 0.13 0.66 0.21
2011 11.16 2.50 6.81 1.85 0.22 0.61 0.17
2012 6.59 1.41 2.58 2.60 0.21 0.39 0.40
2013 −3.80 −1.42 −6.13 3.76 0.37 1.61 −0.99
2014 −7.81 −0.43 −9.48 2.09 0.06 1.21 −0.27
2015 −9.45 −0.96 −10.30 1.82 0.10 1.09 −0.19
2016 −10.57 −6.51 −4.56 0.50 0.62 0.43 −0.05
Hebei 2008 15.06 3.57 5.96 5.54 0.24 0.40 0.37
2009 −11.02 −5.03 −8.16 2.18 0.46 0.74 −0.20
2010 9.49 3.91 1.07 4.51 0.41 0.11 0.48
2011 7.53 4.85 −2.02 4.70 0.64 −0.27 0.62
2012 6.22 2.06 4.39 −0.24 0.33 0.71 −0.04
2013 −9.77 −1.85 −9.73 1.80 0.19 1.00 −0.19
2014 −12.81 −0.47 −12.86 0.53 0.04 1.01 −0.04
2015 −11.99 −0.74 −13.77 2.51 0.06 1.15 −0.21
2016 −0.20 −0.60 0.48 −0.07 3.03 −2.39 0.36
Shanxi 2008 1.30 0.54 0.59 0.17 0.41 0.45 0.13
2009 0.51 0.64 0.84 −0.97 1.26 1.64 −1.90
2010 0.55 0.25 −0.40 0.70 0.46 −0.73 1.27
2011 −2.14 −0.64 −1.04 −0.46 0.30 0.49 0.22
2012 2.63 0.38 0.67 1.58 0.15 0.25 0.60
2013 −0.57 −0.37 −0.93 0.72 0.64 1.63 −1.26
2014 −0.37 −0.03 −0.41 0.07 0.09 1.10 −0.19
2015 −0.35 −0.04 −0.36 0.05 0.12 1.02 −0.14
2016 −0.25 −0.03 −0.22 0.01 0.13 0.89 −0.02
(continued on next page)
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Table B1 (continued)
Provinces year △scale Decomposition Contribution rate
△MP △SR △C MPcontri SRcontri Ccontri
Inner Mongolia 2008 18.35 7.79 1.18 9.37 0.43 0.07 0.51
2009 −4.66 −11.47 −14.49 21.30 2.46 3.11 −4.57
2010 2.38 8.98 4.73 −11.34 3.78 1.99 −4.77
2011 14.76 9.07 6.02 −0.33 0.61 0.41 −0.02
2012 6.93 3.75 3.21 −0.02 0.54 0.46 0.00
2013 5.85 −3.91 −3.33 13.10 −0.67 −0.57 2.24
2014 −11.18 −1.49 −1.37 −8.33 0.13 0.12 0.75
2015 −34.64 −3.94 −17.59 −13.11 0.11 0.51 0.38
2016 −24.49 −1.79 −20.04 −2.66 0.07 0.82 0.11
Liaoning 2008 9.83 0.71 8.81 0.32 0.07 0.90 0.03
2009 −19.83 43.30 −72.07 8.93 −2.18 3.63 −0.45
2010 8.58 −1.04 10.36 −0.74 −0.12 1.21 −0.09
2011 13.25 1.31 6.21 5.73 0.10 0.47 0.43
2012 19.88 1.17 10.66 8.05 0.06 0.54 0.41
2013 −17.88 −1.19 −10.60 −6.10 0.07 0.59 0.34
2014 −3.48 −0.26 −3.63 0.41 0.07 1.04 −0.12
2015 −15.91 −3.12 −12.91 0.12 0.20 0.81 −0.01
2016 −18.80 2.54 −21.02 −0.32 −0.14 1.12 0.02
Jilin 2008 4.64 1.81 2.14 0.70 0.39 0.46 0.15
2009 −4.51 −2.24 −2.80 0.52 0.50 0.62 −0.12
2010 4.56 1.80 0.40 2.35 0.40 0.09 0.52
2011 −1.76 1.80 −5.03 1.47 −1.03 2.86 −0.84
2012 5.57 0.72 2.02 2.83 0.13 0.36 0.51
2013 1.02 −0.88 −3.91 5.81 −0.86 −3.84 5.70
2014 −8.49 −0.25 −8.06 −0.18 0.03 0.95 0.02
2015 −9.74 −0.76 −8.44 −0.55 0.08 0.87 0.06
2016 0.86 0.33 0.52 0.01 0.39 0.60 0.01
Heilongjiang 2008 17.54 4.02 14.12 −0.60 0.23 0.81 −0.03
2009 −27.62 −2.44 −23.90 −1.29 0.09 0.87 0.05
2010 10.60 1.08 9.91 −0.39 0.10 0.94 −0.04
2011 20.04 3.61 11.61 4.81 0.18 0.58 0.24
2012 −13.25 1.49 −11.04 −3.71 −0.11 0.83 0.28
2013 −13.27 −0.62 −13.09 0.45 0.05 0.99 −0.03
2014 −10.52 −1.34 −5.28 −3.90 0.13 0.50 0.37
2015 −10.54 0.86 −11.36 −0.04 −0.08 1.08 0.00
2016 1.90 2.75 −1.88 1.03 1.45 −0.99 0.54
Shanghai 2008 5.43 1.27 4.05 0.11 0.23 0.75 0.02
2009 −10.53 −1.43 −9.28 0.18 0.14 0.88 −0.02
2010 6.95 1.03 3.51 2.41 0.15 0.51 0.35
2011 13.33 1.91 8.71 2.71 0.14 0.65 0.20
2012 9.45 1.39 5.22 2.84 0.15 0.55 0.30
2013 −6.66 −1.40 −8.44 3.18 0.21 1.27 −0.48
2014 −9.20 −0.37 −8.88 0.05 0.04 0.97 −0.01
2015 −13.51 −0.52 −13.27 0.28 0.04 0.98 −0.02
2016 −21.03 1.31 −22.19 −0.15 −0.06 1.06 0.01
Jiangsu 2008 17.77 3.77 7.55 6.45 0.21 0.43 0.36
2009 −24.99 −2.98 −22.04 0.04 0.12 0.88 0.00
2010 20.33 2.13 15.79 2.42 0.11 0.78 0.12
2011 25.18 6.08 13.46 5.64 0.24 0.53 0.22
2012 27.56 3.67 7.81 16.08 0.13 0.28 0.58
2013 −11.24 −3.98 −16.22 8.96 0.35 1.44 −0.80
2014 −19.66 −1.22 −21.86 3.42 0.06 1.11 −0.17
2015 −44.09 −1.20 −44.38 1.49 0.03 1.01 −0.03
2016 −1.79 −0.30 −1.56 0.07 0.17 0.87 −0.04
Zhejiang 2008 2.60 0.83 1.81 −0.04 0.32 0.70 −0.01
2009 −7.22 −1.74 −7.63 2.14 0.24 1.06 −0.30
2010 3.49 −6.25 19.23 −9.48 −1.79 5.50 −2.71
2011 6.10 0.69 4.11 1.30 0.11 0.67 0.21
2012 5.78 0.62 2.59 2.57 0.11 0.45 0.44
2013 −12.58 −0.27 −13.20 0.88 0.02 1.05 −0.07
2014 −18.29 0.14 −16.05 −2.38 −0.01 0.88 0.13
2015 −13.76 2.24 −11.08 −4.92 −0.16 0.81 0.36
2016 6.07 5.34 3.28 −2.56 0.88 0.54 −0.42
Anhui 2008 1.81 0.56 0.57 0.67 0.31 0.32 0.37
2009 −1.87 −0.68 −2.57 1.38 0.36 1.37 −0.74
2010 4.46 0.74 2.42 1.30 0.17 0.54 0.29
2011 5.21 1.51 3.62 0.08 0.29 0.70 0.02
2012 4.80 0.82 1.09 2.89 0.17 0.23 0.60
2013 −1.39 −0.88 −3.89 3.38 0.63 2.79 −2.42
2014 −9.12 −0.22 −10.16 1.25 0.02 1.11 −0.14
2015 −8.03 −0.81 −7.67 0.45 0.10 0.96 −0.06
2016 −1.87 0.59 −2.31 −0.16 −0.32 1.23 0.08
(continued on next page)
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Table B1 (continued)
Provinces year △scale Decomposition Contribution rate
△MP △SR △C MPcontri SRcontri Ccontri
Fujian 2008 0.48 0.04 0.37 0.08 0.08 0.77 0.16
2009 −0.91 −0.84 −2.46 2.40 0.93 2.72 −2.65
2010 1.59 0.29 −0.18 1.48 0.18 −0.12 0.93
2011 0.85 0.28 0.01 0.57 0.33 0.01 0.67
2012 2.72 0.19 0.02 2.50 0.07 0.01 0.92
2013 −2.90 −0.18 −3.98 1.25 0.06 1.37 −0.43
2014 −3.39 −0.36 −6.97 3.95 0.11 2.06 −1.17
2015 −7.08 0.39 −7.15 −0.32 −0.06 1.01 0.05
2016 −5.73 2.14 −6.91 −0.97 −0.37 1.21 0.17
Shandong 2008 6.79 1.73 0.87 4.20 0.25 0.13 0.62
2009 −27.22 31.02 −50.65 −7.58 −1.14 1.86 0.28
2010 15.44 −0.81 16.42 −0.17 −0.05 1.06 −0.01
2011 17.98 0.77 16.87 0.34 0.04 0.94 0.02
2012 15.16 1.50 7.41 6.25 0.10 0.49 0.41
2013 −12.61 −1.50 −14.77 3.66 0.12 1.17 −0.29
2014 −25.68 −0.39 −25.90 0.62 0.02 1.01 −0.02
2015 −23.92 1.28 −24.90 −0.30 −0.05 1.04 0.01
2016 −15.03 6.83 −21.36 −0.49 −0.46 1.42 0.03
Henan 2008 18.97 6.41 8.21 4.34 0.34 0.43 0.23
2009 −30.09 −5.83 −22.79 −1.46 0.19 0.76 0.05
2010 10.15 3.18 9.02 −2.05 0.31 0.89 −0.20
2011 15.49 4.92 8.77 1.80 0.32 0.57 0.12
2012 43.15 3.30 6.39 33.47 0.08 0.15 0.78
2013 −12.37 −4.14 −13.11 4.88 0.33 1.06 −0.39
2014 −31.33 −1.12 −20.64 −9.57 0.04 0.66 0.31
2015 −30.59 −1.53 −30.08 1.03 0.05 0.98 −0.03
2016 −26.52 3.70 −31.92 1.70 −0.14 1.20 −0.06
Hubei 2008 3.46 1.13 2.26 0.07 0.33 0.65 0.02
2009 −5.50 −1.00 −5.65 1.15 0.18 1.03 −0.21
2010 5.05 0.77 2.93 1.34 0.15 0.58 0.27
2011 7.48 1.77 4.31 1.40 0.24 0.58 0.19
2012 6.13 1.02 2.30 2.80 0.17 0.38 0.46
2013 −6.83 −0.95 −4.10 −1.78 0.14 0.60 0.26
2014 −5.26 −0.24 −7.87 2.85 0.05 1.50 −0.54
2015 −12.40 −1.64 −8.63 −2.13 0.13 0.70 0.17
2016 −11.26 1.62 −11.78 −1.10 −0.14 1.05 0.10
Hunan 2008 3.49 0.84 1.97 0.68 0.24 0.57 0.19
2009 −4.09 −0.91 −3.77 0.59 0.22 0.92 −0.14
2010 2.33 0.60 1.46 0.27 0.26 0.63 0.11
2011 3.35 1.01 1.49 0.86 0.30 0.44 0.26
2012 3.35 0.55 1.22 1.58 0.16 0.37 0.47
2013 −1.76 −0.57 −2.66 1.47 0.32 1.52 −0.84
2014 −3.36 −0.17 −5.13 1.94 0.05 1.53 −0.58
2015 −6.66 −0.33 −6.91 0.58 0.05 1.04 −0.09
2016 −0.09 0.17 −0.32 0.06 −1.89 3.55 −0.66
Guangxi 2008 0.60 −0.04 0.21 0.44 −0.07 0.35 0.73
2009 −0.15 0.02 −0.14 −0.04 −0.16 0.91 0.25
2010 −0.18 −0.06 0.18 −0.30 0.31 −1.00 1.69
2011 0.22 −0.04 0.38 −0.12 −0.19 1.75 −0.56
2012 −0.09 −0.01 0.03 −0.11 0.12 −0.34 1.21
2013 0.01 0.01 0.10 −0.10 1.16 8.80 −8.96
2014 −1.07 0.01 −0.47 −0.61 −0.01 0.44 0.57
2015 −2.31 0.21 −3.16 0.64 −0.09 1.37 −0.28
2016 −2.87 0.93 −3.21 −0.59 −0.33 1.12 0.21
Hainan 2008 0.37 2.75 −1.18 −1.19 7.35 −3.16 −3.19
2009 −20.77 −9.35 −7.77 −3.65 0.45 0.37 0.18
2010 11.64 −4.04 18.73 −3.06 −0.35 1.61 −0.26
2011 32.37 2.60 19.97 9.80 0.08 0.62 0.30
2012 −0.84 2.15 −1.03 −1.96 −2.58 1.23 2.34
2013 −8.61 −1.76 −7.65 0.80 0.20 0.89 −0.09
2014 −4.22 −0.56 −3.04 −0.63 0.13 0.72 0.15
2015 −14.36 −1.38 −12.75 −0.24 0.10 0.89 0.02
2016 −23.94 7.62 −32.67 1.12 −0.32 1.37 −0.05
Sichuan 2008 55.38 25.50 10.79 19.09 0.46 0.20 0.35
2009 −72.58 −28.49 −42.27 −1.82 0.39 0.58 0.03
2010 88.13 24.17 10.65 53.31 0.27 0.12 0.61
2011 4.82 29.61 3.26 −28.05 6.15 0.68 −5.82
2012 −24.52 9.47 10.11 −44.11 −0.39 −0.41 1.80
2013 69.48 −10.13 −20.04 99.65 −0.15 −0.29 1.43
2014 −67.58 −4.04 −38.21 −25.33 0.06 0.57 0.38
2015 −62.17 −10.94 −45.02 −6.21 0.18 0.72 0.10
2016 −11.09 −15.48 −2.97 7.35 1.40 0.27 −0.66
(continued on next page)
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